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The Law Reform Commission of Canada, in its Working Paper 43
Behaviour Alteration and the Criminal Law, I addresses the issue of the
deliberate modification of human behaviour by medical means. It does so
vis-A-vis non-consensual treatment prescribed in the purely therapeutic
setting as well as with respect to such treatment imposed by way of
sentencing. The Commission focuses its deliberations around three
questions:
2
1. Do present laws provide sufficient protection against involuntary or
non-consensual administration of behaviour alteration treatment?
2. Should psychological integrity be protected by the Criminal Code as
physical integrity already is?
3. Should the law legitimate the use of these techniques for purposes of
criminal sanction as a matter of social control?
During the course of its deliberations the Commission comes to the
conclusion that while current statutes do offer "adequate protection
against assaults on human physical integrity ... the situation is otherwise
regarding psychological integrity."'3 In response to question 2, therefore,
it recommends that the Criminal Code should be amended to protect the
psychological integrity of the person; Le., it recommends that "the
criminal law affirm the right of a psychiatric patient not to be treated
against his will, and to have treatment already under way stopped, with
the reservation of the usual exceptions already acknowledged by law, that
is, in cases of emergency or when the absence of treatment creates a
serious risk for the life and safety of the patient or others".4 As to the third
question and addressing itself explicitly to the criminal context, the
Commission argues that while "curing behavioural problems not only
benefits the incarcerated individual but also society as a whole,"'5 "to
*Professor of Philosophy, University of Victoria.
1. Law Reform Commission of Canada, (Working Paper 43) Behaviour Alteration and the
Criminal Law (Ottawa, 1985).
2. Id, at 4.
3. Id, at 2.
4. Id, at 37.
5. Id, at 42.
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make a direct link between sentencing and psychiatric treatment is to fall
into a trap leading to confusion between treatment and punishment. '6
Consequently, it recommends that "except in cases of emergency, or
when the individual is completely unable to give consent, psychiatric
treatment should never be undertaken without the patient's expressed
authorization"'
These recommendations, as well as the Commissions' reasoning in
support of them, seem eminently reasonable. Nevertheless, they may be
criticized on two grounds: on a general level, they reflect a stance on
behaviour modification as a medical procedure that is incompatible with
the Commission's own view, expressed elsewhere and reaffirmed here,
that the autonomy of the individual in matters medical is a value that
must not be compromised; and on a more particular plane, the
recommendation concerning the criminal context stands in fundamental
opposition to the ethics of the health care professions as such.
These are serious charges. What makes them more serious still is that
the views expressed in this Working Paper appear to be representative of
a position on behaviour alteration that is fairly widespread in the legal
community. The present critique should therefore be seen as being at the
same time an expression of unease with the current views on the subject
as a whole. However, it should also be noted that this unease is not rooted
in legal considerations, although these will be adduced when and where
relevant. Instead, it is centered in ethical considerations that derive from
one of the most fundamental ethical principals of deontological ethics: the
principal of autonomy and respect for persons.8 In that sense, it will be an
ethically oriented critique.
II. The Non-Criminal Context
Considered by itself, the Commission's first recommendation is
unobjectionable. With the exception of but a few carefully delineated
circumstances, it affirms the principle of autonomy and recognizes the
right of competent and informed consent as supreme. However, it is
precisely these exceptive circumstances that constitute the problem. The
Commission's characterization of them is as follows: when the patient's
"condition presents a danger to the life or health of that person or others;
... [when] the patient is totally incapable of taking care of himself; ...
[and when dealing with an] involuntarily hospitalized patient who has
6. Id
7. Id, at 43.
8. Cf., R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), at
70, 196, etpass.; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1971), Chapter IX etpass.
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lucid intervals."' 9 In these cases, so the Commission contends, non-
consensual psychiatric treatment focusing in behaviour alteration is
justified because "Protection of the life and health of others must take
precedence over an absolute right to autonomy."'1 The Commission then
draws an analogy to the case of the person "who is suffering from a
contagious disease but refises to be treated",tt in order to buttress its
stance.
The principle involved here is ethically sound. Autonomy is a
fundamental value of Anglo-American culture, and may not be
compromised except for the most weighty of reasons: public interest, the
safety of others, and the like. Both ethical reasoning and legal opinion
agree on this point.12 However, even when such a compromise is
mandated, it may occur when and only when it can be shown that public
interest constitutes a greater right and is not merely a matter of greater
convenience; that the safety of others does not require the violation of a
fundamental right of the individual himself; and in general, that the
compromise of autonomy as such is the result of a balancing of the rights
of the individual against those of others.13 This is what characterizes our
system of laws as deontological, rather than utilitarian in nature.14
In this sense, therefore, the third-party exceptions mentioned by the
Commission are unexceptionable and the analogy it draws to argue the
point is compelling. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of CaliforniaB5
provides a good example. It is the second-person exceptions that pose the
problem: the individual who is episodically psychotic, and the person
who constitutes a danger to his own life and health. Here the analogy
drawn by the Commission breaks down, and from a purely logical
perspective there exists a probative lacuna.
III. The Episodic Patient
One could, of course, attempt to fill the gap by turning to what the
Commission says elsewhere. For instance, focusing explicitly on the
9. Working Paper 23, at 36.
10. Id
11. Id
12. For an extended discussion of this and related problems, see Stephan L. Chorover,
"Violence: A Localizable Problem?" in E.S. Valenstein, ed., The Psychosurgery Debate:
Scientifir, Legal and Ethical Perspectives (San Francisco, 1980) at 334-347.
13. Re Eve (1979), 10 R.F.L. (2) 317 (P.E.I.S.C. Fam.Div.) (McQuaid, J.), reversed on other
grounds (1980), 74 A.P.R. 87, 27 N. & P.E.I.R. 97 (P.E.I.C.A.), reaffirmed (1986), 31 D.L.R.
(4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
14. For a trenchant discussion of the distinction between the two types of approaches from a
purely theoretical perspective, see R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Prentice-Hall, 1959).
15. 131 California Reporter 14, decided July 1, 1976; 529P.(2d) 553 (C.S.C.).
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patient whose psychosis is of an episodic nature, the Commission argues
that such a person, while in the psychotic state, must be considered "a
person [temporarily] deprived of his mental ability ... of the ability both
to understand what is happening to him and to exercise a rational and
informed judgment." Such a case, so the Commission continues, is
"analogous to that of the highway accident victim brought unconscious
to a hospital emergency ward. ... [I]n such circumstances the
presumption must be in favour of life and health. Medical authorities
should have the right to provide treatment and should not have to
presume that if the person were conscious, he would refuse treatment."16
However, the Commission's reasoning on this point is unacceptable
because the analogy on which it is based does not hold. The point of our
first objection is perhaps best brought out by way of example. Consider
the case of a declared and known Christian Scientist. Let us suppose that
this person is brought unconscious into an emergency ward. If there is
present clear and incontrovertible evidence immediately apparent to the
health care professionals that this individual, while competent, and prior
to the accident, had stated a settled and considered will to refuse all
conventional life-saving or other medical treatment, neither the fact of
emergency nor that of life-threatening circumstances will ethically allow
the medical authorities to ignore such a disposition, the fact of present
unconsciousness notwithstanding.1 7 Similarly, let us suppose that a
person brought unconscious into a hospital emergency ward per I.D.
check is found to be a Jehovah's Witness. Let us suppose further that he
has with his I.D. a properly executed affidavit requesting that no blood
transfusion be given even though his life be in peril. In that case, too, it
is ethically clear that neither the fact of emergency nor the fact of
16. Working Paper 43, at 21.
17. Cf Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 26. Medical Treatment and
Criminal Law (Ottawa, 1980) at 70-73. But see: Attorney General of B.C. v. Astoforoff, [1984]
4 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.C.A.), affirming [1983] 6 W.W.R. 322,47 B.C.L.R. 217 (B.C.S.C.) which
states that an incarcerated person has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. However the
court then argued that:
If she [Astoforof] becomes unconscious or incapable of making a rational decision, that is
another matter. Then she will be unable to make a free choice. But while she is lucid no
law compels the prison officers to apply force to her against her will.
at 327 (W.W.R.). This suggests that the courts might consider the fact of incompetence to
extinguish the competent's right of refusal. However, in 1985 Mary Astoforoff died of self-
imposed starvation while imprisoned. This seems to suggest that the decision was not read in
this fashion by the provincial authorities. The case of Elizabeth Bouvia may be thought an
exception (Bouvia v. Company of Riverside, No. 159780, Supreme Court, Riverside County,
California, December 16, 1983, Transaction 1238 - 1250). However, it should be recalled that
Bouvia was self-admitted for treatment of suicidal depression.
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unconsciousness nor the threat to his life will allow the attending
physician to ignore this request and proceed with a transfusion.18 The
Commission itself, in an earlier Working Paper, 19 agreed with and indeed
was quite clear on that point. Consequently, if the analogy to the
emergency ward situation is to be taken at all seriously, consistency
requires that the Commission not proceed differently in this case. It must
limit the generality of its recommendation by acknowledging that an
episodic psychotic individual has the right, when competent, to declare
whether or not and in what fashion he wishes to be treated should he, at
some time in the future, become psychotic and endanger his life or
health.20 Nor would it be possible to escape this inference by arguing that
the very fact of such a declared intention by the patient when allegedly
competent eo ipso constitutes non-rebuttable evidence for the claim that
competence did not in fact obtain. Not only would that be a most flagrant
example of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning, it would also contradict
the Commission's own declared position elsewhere.
21
This line of reasoning also has another facet. The Commission itself,
echoing Quinlan22 and Colyer,23 continues that "incompetence should
18. Cf Ruth Macklin, "Consent, Coercion, and Conflict of Rights" (1973), 20 Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine 370-371; N. L. Cantor, "A Patient's Decision to Decline Lifesaving
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life" (1973), 26 Rutgers Law
Review 228-261. For a relevant guiding opinion, see Re Farrell, [1987] 529 A. 2d 404: "... it
is the patient's preference... that should control. The privacy that we accord medical decisions
does not vanish with the patient's condition or progress." (emphasis added).
19. Cf Working Paper 26 at 64-73. In note 375 the Commission here lists a series of cases in
support of its position that:
... the preponderance of legislative, judicial, professional, and public attitudes favour the
recognition of the right to refuse treatment. The general approach of the Criminal Code is
supported by the Common Law dealing with private matters. The overwhelming majority
of these cases support the right of a competent adult to refuse treatment. This right is also
preserved in the medical Code of Ethics and recognized in the hospital patients' bill of
rights.
20. For a discussion of analogous considerations, see H.T. Howell, R.J. Diamond, and D.
Wikler, "Is there a Case for Voluntary Committment?" in T.L. Beauchamp and L. Walters,
Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (Wadsworth, 1982) at 163-168, esp. at 165. We adopt the
concept of a "Ulysses contract" here proposed as extended to include not simply acceptance
of treatment when incompetent in the future, but also refusal. See also Rebecca Dresser,
"Bound to Treatment: The Ulysses Contract" (1984), 14 The Hastings Center Report 13-16.
21. Working Paper 43 at 19. See also D.E Greenberg, "Interference With a Suicide Attempt"
(1974), 49 New York University Law Review at 227-229. While Greenberg recommends
initial interfesence, he argues that the choice of death may not be irrational and evidence of
incompetence and therefore limits the restraint to a time period not exceeding 24 hours. See
also R.B. Brandt, "The Morality and Rationality of Suicide", in S. Perlin, ed. A Handbook for
the Study of Suicide (Oxford University Press, 1975).
22. Matter of Quinlan, 305A. (2d) 647, 70N.J. 10355A (2d) 647 (N.J.1976), N.E. (2d) 918
(1972).
23. Matter of Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.(2d) 735 (Supreme Court of Washington 1983)
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never be taken to imply the complete deprivation of the person's right,
and more specifically, the person's right to refuse treatment."24 If the
Commission insisted that the wish of an episodic patient that he not be
treated (expressed when competent) need not be honoured when he is
incompetent, then it would be guilty of contradicting just that injunction.
Either that, or we should have to assume that the Commission holds as
a matter of general policy that the dispositions of a competent person are
effective only for as long as the person is competent. The whole concept
of prior determination would then lose all relevance. It is difficult to see
which of these alternatives is the less defensible.25
IV. The Analogy of Emergency
The emergency ward analogy itself is also beset with problems. While it
may hold for the incompetent psychotic without a readily available
history who is brought in for the first time, it is inappropriate both for the
patient who has been institutionalized before or for whom there is a
readily available history, as well as for the episodic patient whose
episodes are known. In all of these cases there is an available fund of data
that the health care professional can draw on, even in case of an
emergency. In case of the episodic patient there is even an element of
predictability. Unlike the highway accident case, the occurrence of the
emergency itself is neither unique nor unexpected. In fact, the
professional can prepare for the eventuality by eliciting the wishes of the
.patient while he is competent as to what should be done with him were
he to become incompetent once again. Failure to do so would actually
constitute an omission that denied the autonomy of the patient, and
ethically speaking would amount to unprofessional conduct.
The point can be argued somewhat differently by focusing on the
concept of emergency itself. We can distinguish two kinds of
emergencies:26 those that require an immediate response but whose
occurrences, either as to onset or as to particular nature, are unforeseen
and unforeseeable;27 and those that require an immediate response but
24. Working Paper 43, at 36.
25. For a brief analysis of different views, see Ellen Picard, Legal Liability of Doctors and
Hospitals in Canada (Toronto: The Carswell Company Ltd., 1978), at 69-70; and Law Reform
Commission of Canada Working Paper 26, Medical Treatment and the CriminalLaw (Ottawa:
Supply and Services, 1980).
26. For an analysis involving further distinctions, see J.E. Magnet and E.W. Kluge,
Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborn Children (Brown Legal Publications, 1985),
at 163-164.
27. The two are logically distinct (see note 26, supra); but the distinction here makes no real
difference if we assume reasonable care.
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whose occurrences can in fact be reasonably foreseen. The emergency
ward situation envisioned by the Commission in its analogy is, ceteris
paribus, of the former variety; the case of the episodic psychotic (or of the
patient, who, although institutionalized, is not wholly incompetent
although progressing in that direction)28 is of the latter. While the
doctrine of emergency applies to instances of the first sort, it does not
apply to examples of the second. The distinguishing feature - the
inherent inability to obtain a prior competent consent - is missing.
The very nature of behaviour modification itself entails that the
relevant therapy cannot be an emergency situation response. By
definition, an emergency action is an action whose primary purpose is to
ameliorate those parameters that require immediate attention so that
more measured steps can be taken. Its primary purpose is to buy time, so
that the situation itself can be appropriately attacked at its causative roots.
Even where the emergency action and the long-term treatment are
materially the same, this time-buying purpose is primary. What
characterizes the situation as emergency is that time is of the essence.
By its very nature, therefore, an emergency treatment cannot be
protracted or involve separate sessions with time intervening. That,
however, is precisely what characterizes the temporal framework of
behaviour alteration techniques. Psychiatric and behaviour therapy,
electroconvulsive therapy and electrical stimulation of the brain - even
psychosurgery - all either require extended time in their planning and
execution or involve a protracted and temporally separated series of
treatments. Even drug therapy is no exception. While behaviour-altering
drugs can be administered on an emergency basis, they will have the
desired behaviour-attering effect only when they are part of an extended
course of treatment. This removes them from the realm of emergency
ministration. In all of these cases, therefore, there will be time to
determine whether the patient, when competent, has previously
expressed any relevant wishes; or, failing that, time to engage the proxy
decision-making machinery that is otherwise considered appropriate in
the case of incompetent persons. The comparison to the highway
accident victim who arrives in the emergency ward, therefore, fails even
from the side of the action.
V. The Vitalistic Presumption
The fact that time is not of the essence in the employment of these
procedures entails another point of difficulty: the claim that the
28. In other words, a patient who is progressively deteriorating in mental capability and
acuity.
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presumption must be in favour of life and health cannot here be upheld
in quite as absolute a fashion as the Commission contends.
By itself of course, as a procedural maxim where all other things are
equal, the principle holds; and the actions it mandates must be pursued
with full force. However, what is covered by the ceterisparibus clause is
a series of assumptions: that time is of the essence, that there are no
known (or reasonably knowable) prior determinations of a competent
nature, and that there is no expectation that the quality of life to be faced
by the patient as a result of the procedure will be unacceptably low, so
low as to constitute what in the words of one commentator amounts to
an "injury of continued existence". 29
It is the quality-of-life parameter that is the problem. It is universally
agreed that a competent decision-maker may reasonably appeal to such
considerations to defend the acceptability of a particular decision, either
for or against a medical treatment.30 In the case of the episodic
incompetent patient, of course, and especially in the case of the episodic
incompetent who either did not or could not engage in such
considerations, such a reasoning process will not obtain. It is here that the
proxy decision-maker must step in. Acting, as it were, in statu personae,
he must engage in the relevant decision-making process for the patient,
lest the patient lose his rights because of his handicap.
The Commission has gone on record in defence of the proposition that
the rights of the incompetent must not be less than the rights of the
competent solely because of his incompetence. In the present context this
means that the decision-making process of the proxy decision-maker
must not differ from that of the competent person to such a degree that
the right of the incompetent is in fact lessened. This, however, entails two
conclusions. First as to the case of the episodically incompetent whose
value-system when competent is known, it entails that the proxy
decision-maker must employ these values when attempting to arrive at a
decision. There must be no attempt either to ignore or to subvert them
simply because they disagree with those of the rest of the society or the
proxy decision-maker himself. Second, for the case of the episodically
incompetent whose value-system is not known, it entails that the proxy
29. H.T. Engelhardt, Jr., "Euthanasia and Children: The Injury of Continued Existence"
(1973), 83 Journal of Pediatrics 170.
30. Law Reform Commission of Canada Report 20, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and
Cessation of Treatment (Ottawa, 1983) at 12:
A third principle which any reform proposal should acknowledge is that human life should
be considered not only from the "quantitative" perspective, but also from the "qualitative"
perspective. When patients freely choose to refuse treatment, their choice is often based
upon quality-of-life considerations.
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decision-maker must attempt to elicit it through consideration of the
pattern of previous decision and actions. When that fails he must employ
those values that are normally adopted by the reasonable person in
society, and must reach a decision on that basis - even if it disagrees
with his own personal predelictions.31 In this last sort of case in particular,
the considerations will usually involve quality-of-life parameters simply
because these are usually addressed by the reasonable person when
evaluating serious medical alternatives. Finally, it entails that the proxy
decision-maker must survey the whole range of decision options that are
otherwise open to the competent person. That means that the option of
non-treatment must not be foreclosed apriorL
"The presumption must be in favour of life." Indeed, but it is a
rebuttable presumption; and what is more, it is a presumption which,
given the available time-frame in each instance, must in fact be examined.
Failure to do so, and refraining from doing so as a matter of principle,
would constitute the height of discrimination.
VI. The Congenitally Incompetent Patient
The preceding considerations, which centre on the possibility/fact of a
previous and competent determination, clearly do not apply to the
congenitally incompetent.32 Ex hypothes4 there is no previous competent
behaviour pattern from which a value-system could be elicited, nor is
there a previous competent determination that must now be applied. It is
tempting, therefore, to argue that here the Commission's reasoning
applies with full force, that here the presumption must be in favour of
treatment because this alone would reflect the current social and legal
inclination in favour of life and health.
Such an argument would have a point, but once again, it would not
hold absolutely. There would still be conditions. These would focus on
the requirements that hold, both ethically and legally, for a proxy
decision-maker as such. To be more specific, it is agreed on all hands that
the proxy decision-maker, whoever he may happen to be,33 must evaluate
31. Cf. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kansas 393,350 P.(2d) 1093, cert. den. 187 Kansas. 186,354,
P.(2d) 670 (1960); Cobb v. Grant, 8 Cal. (3d) 229,502 E(2dl), 107 Cal. Rep. 505 (1972).
32. We are here considering the congenitally incompetent who is so incapacitated that, in the
Commission's words, he is "always incapable of giving valid consent"; and what is more, is
conceptually so limited that no relevant opinion or preference can reasonably be elicited either
from his actions or his words, if they exist at all. Those congenitally incompetent who do not
fall under this severe rubric must be considered on a special case-by-case basis. This also
includes the episodically incompetent who has made no prior determination and whose values
cannot be determined from his prior habitus.
33. For an extended discussion of the ethics of proxy decision-making, see Magnet and Kluge
(1985), supra, note 26, Chapter Two: I & II and Chapter Three: III.
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and choose among alternative courses of action not haphazardly or on
the basis of whim, but reasonably - on the basis of criteria and values.
It is also agreed that these latter must not be idiosyncratic to the proxy
decision-maker himself, reflective only of his own particular stance. After
all, there is no guarantee that the latter will be consonant with the
prevailing standards of society, in which case the incompetent, were he to
be served in this fashion, might well become the victim of circumstance.
He would be penalized for his bad fortune of having been assigned this
particular proxy. Instead, the proxy decision-maker must decide on the
basis of criteria and of values that embody the standards adhered to by
the reasonable person under those conditions.34
This, however, once again undercuts the absolutistic stance of the
Commission. Specifically, it means that here, too, the option of non-
treatment cannot be ruled out on an a priori basis, nor can quality-of-life
considerations be deemed irrelevant. Consequently, it may well happen
that from this reasonable-person perspective, which includes quality-of-
life considerations that trade appreciably lowered intellectual acumen,
flattened effect, reduced capability for social interaction and no great
likelihood of cure for the patient against greater manageability of the
patient for the health-care professional, the option of non-treatment is the
only acceptable choice.35
This is not to say that non-treatment is always the reasonable choice,
or, for that matter, that it is the reasonable choice in the preponderance
of cases. It is merely to say that the options must be evaluated
independently and anew on each occasion and that the Commission's
blanket injunction cannot be supported as a matter of rule. The proxy
decision-maker must look and see. Otherwise what has almost
universally been condemned in other health-care contexts may well occur
here: treatment without regard for the rights of the individual, and
without due consideration of quality of life.
VII. The Criminal Context
The Commission's recommendations concerning the criminal context
present another array of difficulties, both as to consistency with the
Commission's overall position as well as with respect to ethical tenability.
34. Here arises another problem. How far may/must a proxy decision-maker go in order that
his decision be so reflective? What if the societal norm of reasonableness is in fact ethically
reprehensible? We shall not address the issue here.
35. This would be in keeping with the criteria for life-saving intervention proposed by A.R.
Jonsen, R.H. Phibbs, W.W. Tooley and M.J. Garlan, "Critical Issues in Newborn Intensive
Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal" (1975), 55 Pediatrics 760. See also R.
Veatch, Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution" Our Last Questfor Responsibility (Yale,
1976) at 122-144.
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As was mentioned at the outset, the Commission asserts the supreme
right of the individual, even when sentenced and incarcerated, to
complete self-determination in matters medical. Psychiatric treatment is
not excluded: "Except in cases of emergency, or when the individual is
completely unable to give consent, psychiatric treatment should not be
undertaken without the patient's express authorization".36 But how is this
to be reconciled with the very acceptance of court-imposed treatment for
convicted offenders? It would seem scarcely plausible to suggest that in
such cases the offender has voluntarily (and competently) agreed to the
relevant course of treatment independently of and prior to the judicial
order; and that the latter constitutes no more than a judicial note-taking
of a decision reached independently by the offender.
But even outside of the sentencing context, there is the question of
voluntariness, of the uncoerced acceptance of behaviour modification
treatment by the prisoner while in the prison setting. The genuineness of
such a decision can be and has been questioned. The classic statement of
this is the U.S. case of Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health. 37 The
thrust of that decision was that the freedom-impairing parameters
operative in the prison setting are so pervasive and so severe that as a
matter of principle, despite the prisoner's avowed consent and despite
scientific scrutiny, the voluntariness of such a decision cannot be
established with sufficient degree of certitude.
The Commission is not unaware of this case. In fact, it takes explicit
cognizance of it, only to reject it: "This position ... appears to us too
extreme ... It is difficult to generalize and to conclude that a person
incarcerated is thereby always incapable of giving valid consent.... In
the Commission's view, the mere existence of difficulties relating to a
prisoner's consent is not sufficient reason for systematically eliminating
psychological treatment programmes from the institutional milieu".38
This stance is consistent with the Commission's earlier expressions on
the subject, viz. its Working Paper 26, Medical Treatment and the
Criminal Law. 39 While the Commission acknowledged that "more subtle
coercion exists in the treatment environment such as... the institutional
setting, and the influence of other patients and staff," 40 it refused to deny
the impossibility of truly voluntary acceptance. In a similar fashion
Margaret Somerville, in a Study Paper prepared for the Commission,
36. Working Paper 43, at 43.
37. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County,
Michigan, 1973).
38. Working Paper 43 at 30.
39. See note 17, supra.
40. Working Paper 26 at 66.
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Consent to Medical Care,41 highlights the dangers but does not rule out
voluntary consent. She merely sounds a severe warning: "The coercive
factors which have been identified in prison life are multiple, and the very
fact of institutionalization may lead to an inability to make decisions and
a dependence on those in authority" 42 (in a word, what is sometimes
called extreme compliance, or the Stockholm Syndrome43).
However, contrary to the impression that may be fostered by these
* sober reflections, Kaimowitz is not a panic phenomenon nor does it stand
alone. Its most prestigious support comes from the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural
Research which, in 1977,44 in a Report to the President of the U.S.,
Congress and H.E.W, recommended that:
Because institutionalized persons may be vulnerable as a consequence of
their disability or the dependence and depersonalization which often
results from confinement, the [Institutional Review Board] should
scrutinize with care the consent of such persons to determine whether it is
adequate. If the I.R.B. has good reason to believe a patient is unable to
give consent to psychosurgery, the provisions of Recommendation (3) will
apply.
Recommendation (3) A psychosurgical procedure should not be permitted
on an adult patient who (i) is a prisoner, (ii) is involuntarily committed to
a mental institution, (iii) has a legal guardian of the person, or (iv) is
believed by the Institutional Review Board (I.R.B.) to be incapable of
giving informed consent to such procedure, unless all of the following
conditions are satisfied. (A) A national psychosurgery advisory board has
determined that the specific psychosurgical procedure has demonstrable
benefit for the treatment of an individual with the psychiatric symptom or
disorder of the patient; ... (C) The conditions of recommendation (2) are
fulfilled at the institution where the operation is to be performed, and such
institution is separate from any prison or institution where the patient is
regularly confined; (D) The patient has given informed consent or, if the
patient is believed by the I.R.B. to be incapable of giving informed
consent, the patient's guardian of the person has given informed consent
and the patient does not object; and (E) A court in which the patient had
legal representation has approved the performance of the operation.
While this does not go as far as Kaimowitz, it goes very much further than
the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission might do well to
consider more seriously a remark made by Professor Somerville:45
41. Margaret Somerville, Consent to Medical Care, Study Paper for the Law Reform
Commission of Canada (Ottawa, 1980).
42. Id., at 101.
43. The usual health care term is "extreme compliance". See also G. Bach-y-Rita, "The
Prisoner as an Experimental Subject" (1974), 229 J.A.M.A. 45 etpass.
44. DHEW Publication No. (OS) 77-0001.
45. Somerville, supra, note 41 at 181.
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Loss of freedom of choice of his physician may have a coercive effect apart
from that represented by loss of this liberty itself. If the treating physician
is seen by the prisoner as part of the prison institution, because the
physician is chosen or employed by the prison, the prisoner may feel
compelled to consent to recommended treatment, for fear of receiving a
"bad mark", or an unfavourable medical report, which may count against
him in such matters as parole decisions.
The freedom-impairing parameters in the prison setting are overwhelm-
ing:46 not simply the fact of physical confinement - although that should
not be underestimated 47 - but the fact that the offender finds himself in
a setting where his contact with the professional is not on a personal level
but on a plane where the professional operates as the embodiment of the
profession itself. Each such individual enters upon the scene as part of an
organized administrative framework, having a specific status, wielding
certain powers, and playing a specific role. Whatever the offender's
relationship with these officials otherwise may be, in this setting it is
defined by the role that the professionals play. They are representatives
and embodiments of their professions, and what is more, it is as officials
that they suggest, advise or counsel, with the full weight of profession and
institution behind them. That fact is recognized in Kaimowitz, and forms
the basis of Therens4s and Dedmacn. 49
The Commission attempts to blunt the edge of these considerations by
drawing a comparison to the pressures operative in the ordinary
physician/patient relationship in the usual hospital setting: "In the usual
hospital setting, a patient may be in a somewhat similar situation when
the doctor explains that a cure to a certain illness cannot be achieved
unless he consents to a particular operation. '50 This comparison,
however, fails on several counts. First, the types of pressures that are
operative are entirely different in nature. The physician/patient pressure
in the usual hospital setting can be described as paternalistic. While the
patient may feel pressured, his perception of that pressure includes the
integral and indeed fundamental presumption that the physician's
recommendations are motivated solely by considerations of what is in the
best interest of the patient himself. This is not true in the prison setting.
The type of pressure that is operative here is better described as coercive.
46. We have not focussed on the question whether prisoner's consent is, or can be, truly
informed. For studies on this, see Somerville, supra, note 41, at 100; and D.C. Martin, J.D.
Arnold, T.E Zimmerman, R.H. Richart, "Human Subjects in Clinical Research - A Report
of Three Studies" (1968), 279 N.E.J.M. 1426.
47. Cf Somerville, supra, note 46, at 181 note 656.
48. R. v. Therens, [1983] 33 C.R. (3rd) 204.
49. R v.Dedman, [1980] 15 C.R. (3rd) 261.
50. Working Paper 43 at 30-31.
Behaviour Alteration, the Law Reform Commission and the Courts
The offender feels compelled to accede to the recommendations because
of the fear that refusal to do so will have punitive repercussions. Second,
in the hospital setting there is an immediate and causal connection
between treatment and discharge. The Commission itself repudiates any
similar connection between acceptance of treatment and length/fact of
sentence. The rationale for the pressure, therefore, is entirely different.
Finally, the comparison between the two kinds of settings is itself wide
of the mark. In the first place, the patient usually enters the hospital
voluntarily and deliberately. He voluntarily and deliberately puts himself
into a situation where he knows that he will be presented with a more or
less limited range of options. He also knows that in order to attain the
goal for which he entered this setting he will have to choose from this
limited range. In other words, it is a purposive delimitation defined by the
goals of the patient, and the patient himself ultimately controls the fact of
choice by voluntarily entering the setting. By contrast, the institutional-
ized offender finds himself in an entirely different situation. Ceteris
paribus, he has not voluntarily, deliberately and purposefully entered the
setting. Nor, consequently, is the necessity of choice a fact of his own
choosing. The entire framework of choice, therefore, quite irrespective of
the number of available options, is quite different; and the types of
pressures that are operative - to say nothing about their intensity - are
of a different order from those that obtain in the usual hospital setting.
Second, the patient is not locked into the hospital setting. In principal at
least, he has the right to discharge himself without availing himself of any
of the choices that are offered. Therefore while it is undoubtedly true that
"the patient's choice is... limited and the pressure on him can be very
powerful" 5' he may always escape it by leaving. The general and overall
freedom-imparing parameter that defines the criminal institutional
context is therefore missing. This lends an entirely different air to the
situation.
VIII. Non-Consensual Imposition
As for the non-consensual imposition of treatment by way of sentencing,
the matter is still different. The Commission does not reject such an
imposition as unethical. In its concluding paragraph it "recalls one of its
recommendations made in 1976 which argued for the introduction of
hospital orders into our law. Whatever the technical modalities, this
reform should allow a court to order a prisoner to serve part of his
sentence in a hospital so that he may receive needed psychiatric
treatment."52
51. Id, at 31.
52. Id, at 43.
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This recommendation does not become less problematic for having
been made before. Then as now, it stands in flagrant opposition to the
Commission's own injunction, restated explicitly here, that "psychiatric
treatment should never be undertaken without the patient's express
authorization".53 Are we to assume, then, that incarceration ipso facto
renders the offender incompetent, leaves the courts in the role of proxy
decision-maker and that the order constitutes judicial proxy authoriza-
tion? It is difficult to conceive of any relevant supportive reasoning for
such a contention, especially as the Commission itself is unwilling to tie
incompetence to incarceration.
54
Or are we to assume that the fact of an order itself changes the mind
of the prisoner so that he now - sometimes despite his overt
protestations - voluntarily and competently agrees to what he rejected
before? Somehow, that does not seem quite persuasive, to say nothing
about the fact that it recalls our -previous considerations about the
freedom-impairing effect of authority and institutionalization.
Or are we to understand that the prisoner voluntarily and competently
agrees to such an order, once made, because it would go to the extent and
nature of his sentence? That would be to make "a direct link between
sentencing and psychiatric treatment" in the very fashion the
Commission condemns. 55
Finally, it should be noted that aside from all else, the point of the
Commission's very advocacy of court-imposed treatment contradicts its
injunctions that "treatment should ... never be indirectly imposed.
'56
Surely the point here is not that direct imposition, by contrast, is ethically
acceptable. Or does the Commission wish to defend an ethics that
prohibits the indirect violation of individual autonomy but that approves
of the direct? Or have we wholly misunderstood its position? Does the
Commission really have in mind the thesis that judicial fiat can turn
something that is unethical per se into something that is ethically
acceptable? Does the sentence determine the ethics - or the ethics the
sentence?
IX. Benefit v. Right
If we step back from the details of the Commission's reasoning, we are
struck by its extreme ambivalence even in the matter of rights. On the
53. Id
54. This follows from two facts. First, The Commission is unwilling to accept the thesis that
voluntary consent is not possible in the prison setting, as viz. its rejection of Kaimowitz second
it rejects the thesis that truly informed consent is not possible, as viz. i at 24, 30-31, etpass.
55. Id, at 42. See also pp. 31 and 33.
56. Id, at 31.
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one hand, the Commission insists on the primacy of individual
autonomy; on the other, it contends that the benefit that non-consensual
treatment may have for the whole of society may be an overriding
consideration57. It is, of course, traditional and entirely appropriate to
argue that the exercise of individual autonomy may legitimately be
limited by considerations of social justice and the rights of others. Such
an argument, however, is fundamentally distinct from one that centres on
benefit. It focuses on the interplay of rights. Therefore, in order to
reconcile these two disparate strands, the Commission would have to
show that the failure to order behaviour-alteration treatment (and an
offender's refusal to accept it) and the concommitant failure to bring
about what is of maximal social benefit in fact constitutes an unjustified
infringement on the rights of others taken either individually or as a
group. Again, we face a probative lacuna.
There exists the possibility that this is not really the core of the
Commission's reasoning with respect to rights. It is possible that what the
Commission is really arguing is that the socially unacceptable behaviour
of the convicted offender has reduced the strength of his right to
autonomy to such a degree that society's right to safety and protection
takes precedence; that, consequently, treatment is ethically mandated and
therefore may be imposed by way of sentence to correct an existing
medical problem which gave rise to the infringement of the rights of
others in the first instance. Non-consensual treatment by way of sentence
therefore, so the Commission may be arguing, is mandated not as a
matter of maximal social benefit but as a function of greater rights.
As a defense, however, this, too, would fail, and for reasons that take
us to the very heart of the issue of court-imposed psychiatric treatment.
The question of whose right takes priority is certainly important, and all
other things being equal, may well decide the issue. However, before it
can even be raised we must resolve the question whether it is ethically
appropriate to proceed by way of sentence in the first instance. Is the act
of the offender the result of a medical condition that is psychiatric in
nature, or is it the outcome of an ethically reprehensible stance on part of
the offender? If the former, then the very fact that we are dealing with a
medical condition that has causative impact on the individual's behaviour
would rule out any presumption of competence on the part of the
offender and with it any ascription of guilt. The fact that we should be
dealing with a medical condition would, ethically, mandate a diversion
from the judicial process and make medical treatment appropriate - in
this case, psychiatric. By that very token, however, it would be morally
57. Cf id, at 15-16, 42, etpass.
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unacceptable to impose such treatment by way of sentence, in utter
disregard of the ethical principles that govern medical treatment per se.
The only legitimate way in which the courts could here become involved
would be in the role of proxy decision-makers or as guarantors of the
rights/obligations of the patient; in other words, in the very same way in
which they become involved in other medical cases. This, however,
would place the whole situation on an entirely different footing from the
one adopted by the Commission.
On the other hand, if the act is a result/expression of an ethically
reprehensible outlook or decision on part of the offender, then these
considerations will not apply. The criminal process will be entirely
appropriate and sentencing will be the correct way to proceed. However,
this would still not legitimate the imposition of psychiatric treatment by
way of sentencing. The reason lies in the nature and role of medicine. As
the Commission repeatedly avers, while medicine in general and
treatment in particular fulfill a social function in that they are designed to
meet legitimate health care needs, they are not intended as instruments of
social reform58.To use them in that fashion would be to pervert their very
nature, and the ethics of the medical profession. To impose medical
behaviour alteration therapy by way of sentence, however, would be to
do just that. Consequently, while behaviour alteration treatment may be
effective in producing certain socially very desirable results, to impose it
through sentencing would be to turn the physician into a jailer.
The point is worth restating from a different perspective; that of the
function of sentencing and of incarceration. There is a fatal procedural
flaw in the Commission's overall approach. The Commission never
addresses the question of the purpose of sentencing and incarceration.
That issue, however, is crucially implicated. Whatever the ultimate
outcome of the debate over the issue may be, we can identify four major
functions: to provide retribution, to protect society, to serve as an
example, and to reform the offender. It may be that, ultimately, an
element of all four is involved. However, no matter which of them is
highlighted or which one is considered central, the actual expression of
such a function in terms of legal action must not stand in conflict with the
fundamental presumption of Anglo-American law: the principle of
autonomy. The individual person is assumed to be an autonomous
decision-maker, an independent moral agent; and although the
expression of that autonomy may not amount to licence - it may be
58. Cf id, at 17, 28-33, esp. pp. 29. We find the Commission's own words of supreme
importance: ". . society should also question its motives when it attempts to use them as a
methods of social control." (at 29).
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curtailed when it interferes with the legitimate rights of others - the fact
of autonomy, the nature of the individual as moral agent, may not be
abridged.59
That is to say, none of the four functions just mentioned by themselves
violate the principle of autonomy. However, there are certain kinds of
material acts which, even when considered as expressions of these
legitimate functions, do have that effect - namely, those that interfere
with the basis of the individual's autonomy as rooted in his personality:
in short, behaviour, alteration techniques. As their very name indicates,
their raison d'etre is to alter the behaviour that society finds unacceptable.
Another way of putting this is to say that the function of behaviour
modification per se is to make it impossible for the individual to exercise
his autonomy in the direction of reprehensible acts by curtailing either his
internal ability to choose such an alternative, his ability to conceptualize
it, or his ability to express an action that otherwise he would still
choose.60 The special feature of medical behaviour modification is that it
attempts to effect this by an interference with the physiological basis of
the individual's personality and behaviour. Consequently, it is an
interference with and sometimes even a total abrogation of the basis of
the individual's autonomy. In that sense, and to that degree, it is
fundamentally at variance with the purpose of sentencing and the
fundamental principle of Anglo-American law. The function of
sentencing and incarceration can never be to produce individuals who
automatically and without genuine choice do what is socially
acceptable.61 That would be to confuse the desirability of properly
programmed automata with the value of moral beings. Instead, it is to
encourage the adoption of a morally praiseworthy - which is to say,
competently and voluntarily adopted - ethical stance. That may not
59. To quote the Commission itself: "The notion of personal autonomy is fundamental." (at
15). While the Commission argues that "The legislator may sometimes, in the name of public
good or of the related rights of others, limit or restrict it to varying degrees" (at 16), "sanctions
applied for breaching the law do not in principle go so far as to completely suppress freedom
of choice" (at 29) and a society that subverts that is deemed ethically remiss.
60. Or, of course, a combination of these. The Commission itself explicitly rejects this in
section III, "The Use of Behaviour Alteration Techniques as a Sanction or Method of Social
Control Within the Context of Criminal Law", esp. at 28-29. Unfortunately, the Commission's
treatment of the issues involved here is far too brief.
61. Cf Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reforn A Canadian
Approach (Ottawa, 1987), which insists on the "principles of fundamental justice" as
constituting the governing parameters of all sentencing, and sees a primary purpose of
sentencing to be "promoting a sense of responsibility on part of offenders" (at 155, emphasis
added). It is in this sense that we are to understand the statement that "The fundamental
purpose of sentencing is to preserve the authority of and promote respect for the law through
the imposition ofjust sanctions."
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always be possible. The principle of autonomy, however, requires that
the ideal of moral responsibility cannot be sacrificed to the expediency of
acceptable action. Genuine autonomy entails that the possibility of evil
must always be open. The desideratum of having a citizenry who does
what is acceptable cannot, therefore, be achieved by turning those very
citizens into ethical eunuchs.62
Does this mean that a prisoner can never be the subject of behaviour
modification therapy? To answer unqualifiedly in the affirmative would
be to miss the whole point of the focus on autonomy. It depends on
whether being subjected to such therapy, voluntarily, is ethically
appropriate for someone who is not incarcerated. After all, being guilty,
ethically as well as legally, and being incarcerated are not medical
conditions. It does not, therefore, call for medical treatment, whether that
be agreed to in propria persona or by proxy.
At the same time, however, this does not mean that the prisoner has no
medical needs at all, or that some of these may not be psychiatric. The
real question is, would participation in such a regimen, when agreed to
voluntarily as a matter of purely medical concern and without
involvement of the courts or of the judical process, constitute an injury to
a bonafide patient? If the answer is yes, then it may not be offered in the
prison setting either. That setting, after all, does not alter the fact of injury
should it otherwise obtain.
Non-injury in the ordinary setting, therefore, is a necessary condition.
Is it sufficient? Our previous discussion suggests two considerations. First,
if the condition for which the treatment is prescribed is one for which it
is otherwise considered appropriate, and if, furthermore, it has nothing to
do with the reason why the individual is incarcerated, then in principle
there can be no objection, provided, of course, that the strict requirements
of voluntary, informed and competent consent have been met.63 An
example would be treatment that is intended for and appropriate to
pedophilia, whereas the prisoner is serving a sentence for grand larceny
but has, of his own free will and initiative, requested the treatment in
question.
Second, if the treatment in question is supposed to alter/eliminate the
sort of activity that is the reason for the incarceration itself, then it may
not ethically be offered to the prisoner while incarcerated even if it is
demonstrably effective. The freedom-impairing parameters on which we
62. The Commission appears to favour a citizenry that is able to do evil - free in a moral
sense, but unwilling to do so as viz. pp. 28-29. It never really comes to grips with the question
of how this stance is compatible with non-consensual imposition of behaviour alteration.
63. This is not to imply that we reserve our earlier stand on the subject It is merely the
examination of a logical possibility.
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have already focussed are far too powerful. However, this does not mean
that they may not be offered at all. Once the prisoner has served his
sentence they should be made available to him as a way of allowing him
a means of achieving freedom from recidivism. In other words, they
should be offered to him in the same way in which other non-therapeutic
medical techniques are made available to ordinary citizens as medical
techniques whose purpose is to allow the individual greater control over
his own life by limiting the material expression of certain functions.64
Voluntary sterilization may serve as a model in this regard, as may
voluntary acceptance of antiabuse treatment. It will be clear that the offer
of any such service must be free from and entirely independent of any
involvement by the judiciary or the correctional services, and that it may
not fall under their aegis. The only way in which the judiciary may be
associated is in the very same manner in which it is involved in providing
other medical services - as an agency of government that monitors the
legality of medical services per se.
X. Conclusion
It would be ludicrous to assume that our discussion has touched on, let
alone dealt adequately with, all of the issues that are raised by Behaviour
Alteration.65 Nor have we addressed the question of the consistency of
the Commission's overall ethical stance. For instance, the Commission
vacillates between benefit and rights considerations: between a utilitarian
and a deontological perspective. This issue is of particular importance
because of the ethical inconsistencies that result on particular points. We
have picked up on some of these. In fact, if we were to look for a single
cause of the majority of problems that we have discussed, we should
locate it in the lack of consistency (and clarity) in the Commission's
overall ethical position. To pursue the matter here, however, would go
too far.
At the same time, to conclude without giving praise where praise is
due would be misleading and unfair. The Commission's final call for the
drafting of a code of ethics governing medical treatment in the prison
64. See Working Paper 26 at 57 etpass., with respect to voluntary sterilization. The concept
of a Ulysses contract is also relevant here. See also note 13, supra.
65. For instance, we have not dealt with the Commission's conception of competence, which
plays such a crucial role in these matters. Following its earlier lead (Working Paper 26, esp.
at 59., 67., et pass.), the Commission characterizes it as an essentially cognitive matter
(Working Paper 43, at 19-24). We consider this a mistake. Competence is a multimodal affair
that also involves emotive, mnemonic and valuational parameters. We also have not dealt with
its position on the nature andjustification of punishment, or its claim that behaviour alteration
does not threaten individual autonomy (at 16), to mention but a few issues.
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setting is to be commended. To this should be added institutional ethics
committees to serve as guiding forces in the implementation of such a
code. The ethics committees currently being set up in the hospital sector
might here serve as guidelines.66
66. Such a committee typically includes an administrator, a lawyer, a physician, a nurse, a
handicapped person, an ordinary citizen, and someone trained in ethics. Suitably adjusted to
the prison setting, a committee could include an administrative official, a lawyer, a psychiatrist,
a psychiatric nurse, a former inmate, an ethicist, and someone from the public at large.
